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The Mediatization of War: A Comparison of the American
and German Media Coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars 1
By Gerd Horten

The last fifty years have seen the further expansion of the role of media during times of war.
Although no longer dominated by large-scale propaganda agencies as during the two world
wars, the media nevertheless have become ever more integral to the planning and conduct of
wars. This article applies the concept of mediatization in an attempt to capture the ever
increasing role of the media during war times as part of an ongoing and accelerating historical
process. It uses a comparative analysis to highlight the commonalities of this process as well as
to emphasize national particularities. The article argues that the mediatization of war has
significantly accelerated over the past fifty years and has established the media as the “fourth
branch” of military operations, which is just as essential as the army, navy and air force.

Introduction
A new concept has emerged over the past decade in the discussion of the media’s impact
on politics, society, and culture: mediatization. Mediatization research tries to analyze the
dynamics of our increasingly media-saturated and media-driven societies, which are especially
evident in high modern societies. Stig Hjarvard has defined mediatization as “the process
whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and
their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have become integrated
into the operations of social institutions (family, work, politics, etc.) while at the same time
acquiring the status of a social institution in their own right.” 2
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Two objections, in particular, have been raised in connection with this new terminology
and concept. The first is that this inquiry into the centrality of the media has been the focus of
media research all along, which highlights that mediatization has a long history. We need to
think about mediatization in similar ways as other long-term—but distinct— developments such
as globalization. Neither one of these processes is historically speaking new, yet both of them
have accelerated to such a degree that their effects have become ever more apparent and
profound. As Friedrich Krotz pointed out, “Mediatization thus should be defined as a historical,
ongoing, long-term development in which more and more media emerge and are
institutionalized.” The transition from stone tablets to papyrus, the invention of the printing press
or the emergence of the electronic media are all earlier parts of this historical process. For many
media scholars, mediatization is a grand concept on par with others such as commercialization,
individualization and globalization, and they believe that it will become just as broadly
recognized and applied. 3
The second objection has been raised primarily by British media scholars. Are the new
terms, “mediatization” and “mediatized society,” really superior to the established concepts of
“mediation” and “mediated society,” they ask? Mediatization scholars argue that the new terms
are better suited to capture the broader processes implied in current media developments.
Mediation, for example, is often used to describe direct, face-to-face communication or can be
used to describe the relatively neutral process of relaying information. Utilizing the
mediatization paradigm is better suited to analyze the increasingly complex and ubiquitous ways
by which the media impact our lives. Gianpietro Mazzoleni put it most succinctly: “In brief, the
concept of ‘mediatization of society’ indicates an extension of the influence of the media into all
societal spheres.” 4 Based on the thrust of current media research, it seems certain that the
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concept of mediatization is here to stay. In fact, its usage is rapidly accelerating—in no small
part driven by the dynamic expansion of the new media and their ever increasing applications.
Whether we look at the development of online banking and online newspapers, the accelerating
utilization of media and PR campaigns in politics or the transformation of personal
communication, leisure and our work environments, we are all subject to the expanding
dynamics of mediatization.
The goal of this article is to analyze the media coverage during wartime within the
context of the mediatization paradigm. War and war reporting, like other sectors of our highly
modern societies, have indeed become mediatized, and this history goes back a long way. 5 In his
study on war imagery, Gerhard Paul identified World War I as the first mediatized war. This war
saw the development of large propaganda organizations in all combatant countries. Due to the
vast expansion of newspapers and magazines as well as the development of film and radio
broadcasting, government agencies were able to disseminate their propaganda swiftly and
effectively. The professionalization of advertising and the strict censorship of news media were
additional aspects of this initial mediatization of war. 6 During World War II, these developments
were further heightened and perfected. Hitler’s use of propaganda and the media are well known.
In the United States as well, news censorship flourished even as new information modes such as
live overseas broadcasts became feasible. More often than not, American propaganda was
privatized, carried out by commercial advertising and media professionals and seamlessly
inserted into radio broadcasts, mainstream films and popular magazines. 7
The Vietnam and Iraq Wars seem particularly well suited to analyze the accelerating
impact of the media on wars, since each took place during the next two phases of the
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mediatization process. In the 1950s and 1960s, television came of age in the western world, and
Vietnam became the first televised war. Likewise, the Iraq War of 2003 was fought in the midst
of the digital age, shaped by the novel reporting made possible through technological changes
and the expansion of the new media. This article applies a historical and comparative approach in
order to both trace these developments over time and to account for particularities in national
patterns. Eric W. Rothenbuhler advocated that we study mediatization through “historical and
comparative studies. … How else could we know [that] it is the media and not something else
that produced the historical change other than through comparative study?” 8
The analysis of the media’s influence on wars and wartime reporting has become more
urgent as the media have become ever more integral to the military strategy and the conduct of
warfare. Central to my inquiry are the questions of how and to what degree media war reporting
changed from the Vietnam to the Iraq War and what impact this had on reporters, combatants,
and home audiences. Did military strategies change due to the enhanced media presence? How
did the general public learn about these wars, and how did they respond to these strategies?
Finally, has the relationship between the government, the military, and the media changed
significantly?
This article argues that the mediatization of war significantly accelerated with the news
coverage of the Vietnam War and reached unprecedented levels during the Iraq War of 2003.
Therefore, just as media scholars have described the media as the “Fourth Estate” (next to the
executive, legislative and judicial branches) in order to highlight its importance for the
functioning of the political democratic system, what has emerged by the turn of the 21st century
was the elevation of the media as the “Fourth Branch” of military operations (beyond the army,
4

air force and navy). The utilization of the media in all facets of military strategy and information
operations has become an absolutely essential part of war in the 21st century, and the Iraq War
has provided us with a glimpse into the future of mediatized warfare and war coverage.

Media Coverage of the Vietnam War in the United States and West Germany
Today we remember the Vietnam War as the first televised war. This is no doubt
accurate, as long as we keep in mind that this is a more fitting description for the United States
than other countries, including nations in Western Europe. By the late 1950s, television had
already taken the United States by storm. When it came to news reporting, American television
took a slight lead over newspapers as early as 1964. By 1972, 48 of Americans chose television
as their favorite news medium while only 21 percent preferred newspapers. 9
By comparison, the development of television as an entertainment and information
medium was delayed by almost a decade in West Germany. In 1961, only one in four West
German families owned a TV. By the late 1960s, roughly 75 percent of all homes were equipped
with a television set, which is when TV news began to displace the radio and newspapers as the
primary information media. 10 Therefore, West Germans relied more heavily on the newspapers
to learn about political news, especially during the first half of the Vietnam War. The other major
difference between the United States and the Federal Republic was that America was a
combatant while West Germany never sent any troops to Vietnam. Unsurprisingly, media
scholars have found that the media of combatant countries are usually less critical and more
supportive of wars than those of non-combatants. 11 What is rather astonishing in this context is
5

that the reporting on the Vietnam War in the United States was initially more critical than in
West Germany. Why was this the case?
The short answer is that West Germany was more tightly bound by the Cold War
ideology than any other West European nation. Located on the front lines of the battle against
communism, West German politicians were keenly aware of the dangers of communist
aggression. The containment of the communist foe had provided the unifying foundation for
U.S.-West German relations since the end of World War II. 12 American and West German
politicians ritualistically paid homage to this fact in the early 1960s. Shortly after taking office in
1963, for example, Lyndon B. Johnson affirmed the continuation of John F. Kennedy’s vigorous
anti-communist policies: “This nation will keep its promises from South Vietnam to West
Berlin.” Such messages were well received in the Federal Republic. For the majority of the West
German population there was little doubt that the freedom of their country and the security of
West Berlin were defended in the jungles of Indochina. This “nexus between South Vietnam and
West Germany” was the bedrock of American-German relations in connection with Vietnam and
was repeated by politicians and commentators across the political spectrum. 13
When it came to reporting the early Vietnam War, American newspapers in the years
from 1962 to 1965 were rather accurate. The leading American media reflected the tumultuous
crises and far-reaching decisions which the United States government was deliberating at that
time. While overall supportive of the U.S. government and military, they captured the ambiguous
situation in 1964, which was shared by members of Congress and the American public. Yet few
newspapers officially broke with the government policy like the New York Times, which as early
as 1965 called for a negotiated settlement instead of increased escalation. 14
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West German newspapers viewed the war fairly consistently through the lens of the
containment doctrine. Most prestigious newspapers also deployed the accompanying domino
theory in a myriad of ways to support America’s stance in Vietnam, repeatedly alluding to the
threat of an aggressive communist China. As one journalist in the prominent Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung warned in March of 1964, “If Beijing is successful with its [expansionist]
strategy in this part of the world, it will have a significant impact on the radical revolutionary
movements especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.” Even more broadly was the
endorsement of the influential weekly, Die Zeit, in 1965: “The containment of communism in
Europe was the predominant task of the 1940s and 1950… The containment of China is the
predominant task of the 1960s and 1970s.” 15
Television coverage was equally supportive of the war in both countries and often more
closely tied to the Cold War consensus in the early stages of the war. The coverage often read
like a morality play, pitting good, selfless Americans defending South Vietnamese and
worldwide freedom against conniving, fanatical Vietcong fighters. 16 The daily television news
reports in West Germany were similarly biased towards the American “crusade for liberty.” In
hindsight, those in charge of the news reports at the time argue that this kind of reporting was
typical of the early Vietnam War, when the Cold War rivalry and West Germany’s tensions with
its East European neighbors dominated foreign affairs and mainstream thinking. 17
One exception to this conformist reporting style was in-depth political TV programs,
which emerged slightly earlier in West Germany than in the United States. One of these specialty
programs was Weltspiegel (Mirror of the World), which premiered in 1963 as a half-hour news
show. It focused exclusively on foreign affairs and quickly gained a reputation for quality
7

programming and garnered large audiences. 18 Though its reports often viewed the Vietnam War
through the lens of the accepted Cold War paradigm as well, some were quite remarkable for
their critical tenor. One of these aired in March of 1966, tellingly entitled “The Hopeless War.”
The opening segment set the tone: “The technical equipment, the firepower and thereby the
might of the Americans was never more apparent than in the spring of 1966. Never was America
further away from losing this war—and never further away from winning it.” The reporter
predicted that the United States would have to send one million soldiers to Vietnam in order to
effectively turn the tide of war and doubted that this was politically feasible. 19 This was a
remarkable piece of reporting both for its blunt assessment and its questioning analysis,
especially in early 1966 when West German media were toeing the official government line.
By 1967, the Vietnam War had settled into its own increasingly predictable and savage
routine. America and its allies pointed to their successes by having staved off the collapse of the
South Vietnamese government and temporarily halting the advances of the National Liberation
Front (NLF) and its North Vietnamese allies. Yet all of this had come at a high cost: by mid1967, there were nearly 450,000 American troops in Vietnam, and the pacification measures and
“search-and-destroy” missions were causing heavy casualties while the war effort was ravishing
the U.S. treasury. And despite increasingly atrocious bombing campaigns against North
Vietnam, the enemy was not buckling under the pressure, yet world opinion began to turn
decisively against the United States. 20
Well before Walter Cronkite’s famous statement about an inevitable stalemate in
Vietnam in early 1968, the conditions for such a stalemate were in place. By all accounts, the
turning point of the Vietnam War was emerging in 1967 already. The Tet Offensive merely
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functioned as a giant exclamation mark. The erosion of the support for the war was a confluence
of three distinct yet related factors: “growing divisions in Washington, declining morale among
American troops in the field, and the spread of the antiwar movement into parts of the political
mainstream.” Television and the media followed and reflected this increasing trend, but did not
lead it. 21
The West German media assessed the situation in Vietnam between 1967 and 1969 in a
very similar manner. Like the American media, its German counterpart vacillated between
support and criticism, optimism and pessimism, while the skeptical voices were becoming
markedly louder in 1967. Even papers that had staunchly supported the U.S. parted ways with
the Johnson administration. By late 1967, articles highlighting the unimaginable magnitude of
the bombings became increasingly prevalent. As they pointed out, the United States had already
dropped at least five times as many bombs on North Vietnam as were dropped on Germany
during all of World War II. 22
There is no doubt that the Tet Offensive of early 1968 produced some of the most
dramatic television footage up to that point. Gripping pictures of U.S. soldiers under attack or
injured made the news during the weeks after the initial attacks as well as harrowing video of the
misery of the South Vietnamese population caught in the crossfire. The fighting was savage and,
unlike the pictures of American bombing runs, highly personalized. Some of these images
literally went around the world, and television commentators accompanied them with harsh
criticisms of the Johnson administration. On February 1, 1968 in a commentary on ABC news,
Joseph C. Harsch threw every public pronouncement in doubt: “What government officials say
in private bears little resemblance to the highly orchestrated public good cheer.” The Tet
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Offensive led to a new portrayal of the Vietnam War on American television. This “new image
of the war” significantly scaled back the guts-and-glory reporting, references to World War II
dropped off sharply and “our” war was now simply “the” war. The new consensus was no longer
to win the war, but to get out of Vietnam by saving face—“peace with honor,” as the Nixon
campaign would put it. 23
In the West German media, the Tet Offensive led to a similarly sharp reassessment.
Footage from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front appeared in the West German
TV reporting in the late 1960s, and it shifted the viewpoint from treacherous Vietcong guerillas
to the portrayal of brave patriots who withstood the withering attacks of an overpowering
American goliath. This critical reporting, finally, was capped off by the first reports of the My
Lai Massacre in 1969, which would dominate a good portion of the news coverage that year. 24
This evolution towards a more critical reporting in West Germany in the late 1960s was
part of a veritable media revolution. As Christina von Hodenberg has demonstrated, the West
German public sphere had undergone “a rapid politicization which was part of the ongoing
socio-cultural democratization of the Federal Republic.” As younger, more engaged journalists
were coming of age and were taking over the newsrooms in West Germany, the public tenor
shifted rather swiftly from consensus to conflict. Critical reporting which challenged established
mainstream views now became the new norm. The “consensus journalism” of the 1950s was
swept out. A final sign of this novel news ethos and critical reporting was that the new
generation of journalists actually welcomed the protests and rebellion, which they saw as part
and parcel of a critical public sphere long overdue in West Germany. 25
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The Mediatization of the Vietnam War
In August 1968, more than half of all Americans called the war a mistake, and by
October 1969, a majority considered it morally indefensible. The news coverage of the U.S.
media both reflected and accelerated this shift in public opinion but did not cause it. In West
Germany, the Tet Offensive and the revelations of U.S. atrocities reported in 1969 caused a
similar revision. Not only did the ideological differences of the West German media become
more pronounced, but more journalists were moving towards critical or even outright
oppositional reporting. In the influential weekly magazine Der Spiegel, for example, criticism
and negative reporting focusing on U.S. militarism and deep societal flaws dominated the
reporting on Vietnam between 1970 and 1972. A final trope of reporting, which gained more
currency as the war continued, was the indirect blurring of Nazi war crimes and American
atrocities. Reports of the use of chemical warfare by the United States, the bombing campaigns,
and the mass killings of innocent civilians merged with the domestic discourse of Nazi crimes in
West Germany. 26 Vietnam was increasingly viewed as an unjustifiable, immoral and
reprehensible war.
This comparison between the media coverage in the two countries further calls into
question the power of television reporting as a cause for the increasing opposition to the war.
The impact of “the living room war” on the West German public was far more muted than that in
the United States, and yet the opposition against the war increased just as much. This adds
further credence to the argument that the TV coverage accelerated opposition to the war, yet it
did not cause America’s military defeat. 27 In many ways, this accelerator effect of the media and
television coverage was similar to other mediatized conflicts of the 1960s. As Todd Gitlin has
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highlighted, the student movement was propelled towards ever more spectacular demonstrations,
which ultimately led to the celebrity of the few at the cost of the organizational cohesion of the
movement. Likewise, the Civil Rights Movement partially relied on the use of “dramaturgical”
framing of their demonstrations, knowing full well that the racist outbursts against nonviolent
protestors would be captured by cameramen and replayed on American television screens. In
both of these cases, the media accelerated emerging developments but neither created them nor
decided the final outcome. 28
Moreover, the television footage that Americans or Germans saw on Vietnam was neither
live nor unedited. It took 30 hours for film reports from Vietnam to be shipped, edited and
cleared for American TV screens. In his analysis of TV news programs between 1968 and 1973,
Oscar Patterson found “little graphic coverage” in the TV daily reports. As he concluded, “a
form of selective perception (and more importantly selective retention) on the part of the general
public of certain highly dramatic events has led to the projection of those as characteristic of
television coverage of the Vietnam war to a far greater extent than was actually true.” 29
One of the defining patterns of our mediatized societies might well be its ability to create
a “new memory” of events through repeatedly replaying iconic images and film footage. For
example, the majority of Americans believe that they witnessed the assassination of John F.
Kennedy live on television in 1963, even though the Zapruder film was not available for viewing
until five years after the event. 30 Something similar has happened in connection with the
Vietnam War: iconic images, documentary footage and feature films have forever altered the
memory of what was actually seen on television at the time. The “new memory” of the Vietnam
War has effectively replaced the historical record.
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Overall, the Vietnam War has rightly been viewed as a significant acceleration of the
mediatization of war. But the media reporting did not determine the outcome of the war.
Ironically, though, the lessons which military and political leaders in the United States and
elsewhere applied in the next wars were to no small measure based on the historical fallacy of
the media’s decisive impact.

Interlude: The Gulf War of 1991 in the American and German Media
If Vietnam was the first televised war, the Gulf War of 1991 was the first live television
war. There was only one problem: there was very little live TV coverage of actual fighting
because reporters were effectively barred from the battlefield. In fact, the coverage of the Gulf
War was almost devoid of any live objects: neither the American or Iraqi soldiers nor the Iraqi
civilian population were depicted. It was, as many scholars have argued, primarily “a techno
war,” “a virtual war” dominated by the prowess of military hardware. Footage of bombs
illuminated the Baghdad night sky and precision smart bombs which hit their targets without
fail—those were the images which dominated the live TV coverage during the few months of the
Gulf War in the United States, Germany, and much of the rest of the world. 31
It was a mediatized war controlled by the American military and U.S. media dominance.
The leaders in the Pentagon and the White House had learned the alleged lessons of the Vietnam
War: control the media coverage by denying reporters access to the theater of war. Instead, select
groups of reporters were organized into pools and allowed access to sites in groups and
accompanied by military guides. “Operation Desert Storm,” which was the code name for the
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campaign turned into “Operation Desert Muzzle,” as John R. MacArthur has phrased it, where
“the journalists in the Gulf were reduced to the level of stenographers.” 32
In Germany, the tenor of the media coverage sounded very similar. One steady criticism
was that the German media, television in particular, had relied too much on the CNN version of
the war. Many analysts and journalists alike argued that the war coverage was largely devoid of
serious news content. The media coverage had all the elements of a “macabre video game,” they
argued, which repeatedly showed successful smart bombs hitting their targets, yet shed no light
on the collateral damage created by the vast majority of “un-smart” bombs. 33 Likewise, since the
reporting was driven by commercial incentives, the dynamics of the coverage disintegrated into
infotainment where the reality and brutality of war receded into the background. 34
The Gulf War of 1991 was the last war in which the military could effectively control the
media and almost completely dominate the international coverage. In the media environment of
the 21st century, this level of military censorship is no longer possible. In little more than ten
years, mediatization took a quantum leap forward, largely due to the development of the internet
and social media, new cell phone and satellite technology as well as the emergence of global
rival news networks. As a result, mediatized war would never be the same.

Media Coverage of the Iraq War in Germany and the United States
Germany was one of many European countries that did not join the American-led
“coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 2003. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed
his opposition to the military invasion in the fall of 2002. His stance reflected the opinion of the
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vast majority of Germans and significantly helped his re-election that year. However, Germany
had consistently supported the other war at the time, the war in Afghanistan. This, in fact,
highlighted the consistent policy of Germany as well as a significant number of European and
NATO countries: support for the war in Afghanistan, yet opposition to the war in Iraq. 35
What did the media coverage of the Iraq War in Germany look like, then? To start with,
all German TV channels covered the pre-war phase as well as the initial military campaigns in
great detail. Especially the reporting of the opening phase of the war was similar to the coverage
in the United States. German television stations highlighted the initial “shock and awe”
campaign, and all of them had embedded reporters with coalition forces. What was apparent as
well, however, was that German journalists did not want to repeat the mistakes of the first Gulf
War when the war had been dominated by the “CNN show.” 36 The fact that Germany was not
actively engaged in the Iraq War and that the majority of the German public opposed it
encouraged journalists to put their principles into action.
One of the noticeable differences in the two countries was how little use German
television stations made of reports from their embedded reporters. Only about 2-4 percent of all
reports during the height of the fighting were based on embedded journalists. Considering how
enticing it was to use this live footage, this percentage is very low indeed. This voluntary
restraint was predicated on the skeptical assessment of this military news coverage. Most
German media severely criticized this new strategy and predicted that it would lead to biased and
one-sided reporting. This general suspicion was further supported by a widely reported incident
when an embedded journalist for the German RTL TV channel slipped into a casual “we” while
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reporting the advance of an American unit: “We have the most modern military equipment in the
world.” 37
The second major distinction of the German TV coverage of the Iraq War was the
purposefully broad and varied use of foreign media footage. Instead of relying solely on CNN or
American footage, German TV stations drew from multiple foreign sources to present a more
nuanced picture of the war: nearly 40% came from U.S. and British channels, slightly more than
40% originated from Arab news channels and about 15% of coverage relied on Iraqi sources.
Small percentages also came from Iran, France and Turkey. Most surprising is the fact that the
inclusion of American footage was slightly less frequent than news from Arab stations, mainly
Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV. The most important factor driving this development was the
deliberate decision by the German media not to overlook the civilian victims and the “collateral”
damage, and Arab media were most inclined to highlight this aspect of the war. 38
The third factor which provided a constant check on German TV coverage was that print
journalists were watching their television colleagues closely. While self-reflective news coverage
of crisis situations was not new, the degree of public analysis reached unprecedented levels. In a
four-month period in early 2003, for example, roughly 15% of all war-related articles discussed
the nature of the reporting or highlighted limitations of the media coverage. The medium most
criticized was television. The majority of these articles focused on German media (roughly 30
percent), approximately 20 percent of took aim at American reporting whereas 10-12 percent
were directed against Arab news channels. The most common criticism was the partisan and onesided reporting. While the broad-based denunciation of Iraqi news coverage was hardly
surprising, the strong and near unanimous criticism of U.S. media in the German press was
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noteworthy. The most frequent criticism was that American media rarely showed pictures of
civilian casualties and employed significant self-censorship. 39
Particularly controversial was the handling of images of captured and dead U.S. soldiers
compared with the footage of dead and mutilated Iraqi civilians. One such incidence occurred on
March 23, 2003, when 29 U.S. soldiers were killed and six were captured. The footage of
captured US prisoners and dead American soldiers was distributed by Al-Jazeera. All German
TV stations broadcast parts of it, although usually only in the form of photographs. The appeal
by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who requested that these images not be shown, was
widely denounced as were most mainstream American media which went along with his
request. 40
The coverage of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel provides a further case in point. The
impact of the war on Iraqi citizens quickly became a major focal point in its war coverage. Even
though the magazine held Saddam Hussein primarily responsible for the war and even described
him as a “paranoid despot,” the arguments for the use of military force by the Bush
administration were summarily rejected. What is significant as well was the magazine’s frontal
assault on the American claim that the Iraq War was an integral part of the “War on Terror.” In a
very similar vein, the use of spectacular, Hollywood-inspired footage like the rescue of Jessica
Lynch remained continually suspect in the German media. 41
Overall, this pronounced antiwar reporting in the German media during the Iraq War is
highlighted in international comparisons as well. A study which compared the television news in
the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany found that Germany’s television reports
were the most critical in their coverage and focused most on casualties suffered by the Iraqi
17

population. In the United States, by contrast, the emphases were exactly reversed, with the vast
majority of reports in support of the military campaigns while very little attention was being paid
to Iraq civilian casualties. The BBC coverage held down the golden middle, with roughly equal
coverage of these two topics. 42
While the German media as a whole thus reflected an oppositional reporting of the war,
there is little doubt that the media in the United States were far too deferential to the Bush
administration. The vaunted media watchdog, as most observers argued, had become the demure
government lap dog. The one word most frequently cited to summarize the performance of the
American media during the Iraq War, as even a cursory survey of book titles will attest, was
“failure:” When the Press Fails, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us, So Wrong For
So Long, and so forth. 43
The list of omissions is long indeed. Most important was the media’s failure to set the
record straight in terms of Iraq’s lack of involvement with the 9/11 attacks. In October 2002,
two-thirds of all Americans believed that Saddam Hussein had helped the terrorists carry out the
attacks on 9/11, and roughly the same number of Americans believed that Iraq was close to
developing nuclear weapons and possessed biological and chemical arsenals. After an aggressive
communications strategy by the White House, 70% of Americans supported military action in
January of 2003. In hindsight, several American media admitted their inadequate news coverage
leading up to the war, which led to the unprecedented step of both the New York Times and the
Washington Post publicly apologizing to their readers. Likewise, critics have rightly pointed out
that the American media were far too deferential to U.S. political and military leaders. 44

18

While the soul-searching about the media’s failure during the Iraq War will undoubtedly
continue, a number of conclusions have already surfaced. The first of these confirms what media
researchers have been saying for a while: when a country is determined to go to war, its media
find it difficult—if not impossible—to resist the call to arms. “[Especially] once a war begins,”
as William Dorman has pointed out, “critical thinking in any society, free or not, becomes
virtually impossible.” Whether one calls it groupthink or the power of political and ideological
consensus, the dynamics of these forces are hard to challenge. 45 A wide variety of factors have
further increased this pervasive trend. The ratings war and shrinking newspaper readership have
reduced the ability of journalists to challenge politicians on issues which enjoy wide popular
support. In addition, the White House pursued an aggressive communications strategy which
gradually built a solid consensus behind the war, and anyone who dared question the evidence
was targeted, marginalized or ostracized. Lastly, in the aftermath of 9/11 the volatility of the
country and the patriotism which permeated every aspect of the national culture played directly
into the hands of war proponents and gave them additional leverage. 46
Finally, the American media system has always worked best within a functioning,
oppositional political framework. As the reporting on the Vietnam War highlighted, the majority
of the media shifted its reporting in tandem with the increasing opposition to the war. Not
coincidentally, the “golden age of journalism” in the United States in the late 1960s and early
1970s was also a time period of deep disagreement about the political priorities of the nation,
which provided cover for a more critical and oppositional media. 47
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The Mediatization of the Iraq War
If so much stayed the same in connection with the American media coverage of the Iraq
War, why should we consider it a new chapter in the mediatization of war? Part of the answer is
that U.S. media coverage was not representational of the rest of the world. The irony of this was
that the most advanced and technologically developed country actually saw one of the most
traditional versions of this war. The tight domestic consensus led to a significant self-censorship
by American reporters and editors and ultimately produced a rather one-dimensional view of the
war. As the German case indicated, however, that was not what the rest of the world saw.
The Iraq War represents a new chapter in the mediatization of the war because the media
indeed functioned increasingly as the fourth branch of military operations. The key components
of this transformation are related to three overarching developments: the emergence of rival
global news networks and the creation of an oppositional global public sphere; the
professionalization of the military information strategies and warfare, which included the
utilization of embedded reporters; and, finally, the emergence of the internet both as a medium
for alternative news sources as well as an arena for expanded warfare in the form of cyberwar.
The first of these is one of the most discussed changes of the media war. The global news
monopoly which CNN enjoyed in the early 1990s lasted only briefly. Since the mid-1990s a host
of new global satellite news channels have emerged, and none has attracted more attention than
the rise of Al-Jazeera. To many Western viewers Al-Jazeera is known primarily through its
release of the Osama bin Laden tapes as well as its critical coverage of the Iraq War. Because of
this oppositional reporting, the network quickly acquired the reputation of “Osama’s
mouthpiece” or “Taliban TV” in the United States especially. During the Iraq War, Rumsfeld
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dismissed it as “Jihad-TV.” These characterizations highlight the degree of frustration on the part
of political opponents and indicate the significant cross-currents which Al-Jazeera created. 48
Despite the ongoing controversy over the reporting by Al-Jazeera, the vast majority of
observers point out that the new Arab channel is a reputable news source. By the time of the Iraq
War, 35 million households in the Arab world watched it on a regular basis, and it emerged as a
provider of news for Western networks as well. In addition, Al-Jazeera has rightly been called
“an equal opportunity offender.” In a region where most news outlets are controlled by political
leaders and governments, Al-Jazeera has been roundly criticized and frequently censored by
Arab governments for its critical style of reporting. 49
In the case of the Iraq War, Al-Jazeera’s focus was on the impact of the war on the Iraqi
civilian population. Its images of the wounded and dead made the rounds through Arab as well
as western countries. The decision to release often graphic images was partly driven by the Arab
media environment, where Al-Jazeera was competing with Al-Arabiya and Abu Dhabi
television. However, it was also fueled by sense of hypocrisy, since Western media were often
squeamish about showing the dead soldiers of coalition forces, yet showed no such scruples
when it came to displaying Iraqi dead and wounded. Adel Iskandar and Mohammed el-Nawary
have described the reporting style of Al-Jazeera as “contextualized objectivity.” By this they
mean that the network strives for fair and balanced reporting, yet like all other global news
channels is inextricably linked to the dominant political perspectives of its viewers and driven by
competitive market forces within its region. 50
The new global media rivalry has forever changed how future wars will be covered. As
the American and Western media dominance recedes, competing rival networks are emerging all
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around the globe. The “post-American world,” a term which Fareed Zakaria uses to discuss the
relative decline of American political influence as new economic and political powers emerge, is
reflected in the global shift of war coverage as well. It is bound to remain an integral aspect and
ongoing flashpoint of 21st-century mediatized war. 51
Second, many observers have pointed to the enhanced professionalization of the media
management before and during recent wars. The reason for this accelerated trend is that no
government or military, not even the Pentagon, can any longer control the visual imagery of war.
The best governments can hope for is to shape global and domestic public opinion in their favor
by dominating the war coverage with favorable footage. The new wartime trend is towards
“information warfare,” which includes both “informational operations” and “perception
management.” The ultimate goal is to dominate the communications networks and to utilize the
media to one’s own advantage. 52
In connection with the Iraq War, the core issue which has emerged as one of the main
media controversy was the Pentagon strategy of embedding reporters with coalition troops.
While not entirely new, this integration of journalists with army units was planned far ahead and
reflected the realization on the part of the U.S. Defense Department that it would not be able to
recreate the pool system of the first Gulf War. The military planners took their chances hoping
that the embedding of reporters would provide a steady stream of riveting, positive images of the
military campaign. As most observers agree, the strategy proved successful. When it came to
feeding the unrelenting 24-hour news media cycle, the strategy of embedding journalists satisfied
this media appetite and proved effective in delivering popular footage. Yet is also created a
partial illusion of war and narrowly focused reports which lacked both context and analysis. 53
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The third major shift in the nature of mediatized war is the development and increasing
significance of the Internet and the social media. To start with, as Philip Seib argues, “Cyber
warfare is not science fiction; the first attacks have already occurred.” While there is no evidence
of government involvement in any of the cyber attacks during the Iraq War, both high-profile
Arab as well as U.S. government web sites came under attack as did web sites of Islamist and
antiwar organizations. It is easy to imagine that we have just seen the beginnings of the usage of
cyber warfare by both private parties and governmental agencies. 54
In addition, warblogs became widespread through the Iraq War because they brought
readers close to the action. Unlike embedded reporters, they had the advantage of providing
alternative news sources. The most famous warblog of the Iraq War was written by a twentynine-year-old Iraqi architect, who reported under the pseudonym Salam Pax. During early part of
the war, the site attracted over 100,000 visitors per day. Such blogs created a heavy dose of
verisimilitude and readers quite literally felt that they were closer to the action. The same is true
for the many warblogs written by soldiers, which began to appear in ever greater number. In
addition, the Internet also served as an organizing tool for grassroots journalists and antiwar
activists by creating websites which challenged the official version of the war. 55
There certainly are additional aspects which could be added here which are an integral
part of the enhanced mediatization of 21st-century warfare. The increased targeting of specific
reporters and news channels; the accelerating speed and immediacy of television reporting in the
competitive 24-hour news cycle; the greatly expanded self-reflexivity of the media (media
monitoring and patrolling themselves); the expansion of social media as well as the noticeable
focus on the visual imagery of the Gulf and Iraq Wars—all of these point in the same direction.
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Together with the three broad transformations discussed earlier, they highlight that we have
indeed entered a new stage of mediatized war. As the New York Times commented, we have seen
“the first real war of the Information Age.” 56 While some of these developments, especially the
impact of the internet, are still in the early stages, it has provided us with a glimpse into the
nature of future mediatized warfare.

Conclusion
Mediatization is an ongoing historical development and accelerating process which is
reshaping our society, politics and everyday lives by making the media ever more powerful and
integral. Wars have become increasingly mediatized as a part of this dynamic. This has
significantly altered many aspects of military strategy and warfare as both the media coverage of
the Vietnam and Iraq Wars demonstrate.
This article has analyzed the accelerated mediatization of war over the past fifty years.
The focus was on a comparative view of the media coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars in the
United States and Germany. The purpose of this historical and comparative approach was to
identify some of the patterns of the mediatization of war while simultaneously recognizing
particular national characteristics. As this study shows, the developments are neither uniform nor
unidirectional, depending on the cultural and historical circumstances.
What does all of this mean for the future relationship between the media, the public and
governments before and during wartime? We can draw some significant parallels between the
mediatization of war and the mediatization of politics here. In their research, Gianpietro
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Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz summed up the relationship between media and politics in the
following manner: “The best description of the current situation is ‘mediatization,’ where
political institutions increasingly are dependent on and shaped by the mass media but
nevertheless remain in control of political processes and functions.” 57
This squares closely with the findings of my study. Even during the Iraq War, as the
global media landscape became more competitive and divisive, most national media reflected the
political consensus within their countries. A comparative study of television coverage in
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and India has demonstrated that more than 75
percent of reports in these respective countries stayed within the national consensus while only
about 20 percent were critical or oppositional to dominant political and public sentiments. Denis
McQuail comes to a similar assessment. The mediatization of war has made the information
strategies and control ever more imperative and difficult for governments, but he tempers this by
concluding: “Perhaps most important is still the fact that the mainstream media do not on the
whole represent any real threat to governments that can plausibly claim to be acting in the
national interest and with public support.” 58
The utilization of the media has indeed accelerated over the past fifty years. The
mediatization of Vietnam War has found expression in the phrases “the first television war” or
“living room war.” During the Iraq War, the rise of new global media networks, the enhanced
information warfare and the expansion of the internet have further advanced the integration of
the media into the military strategy of warfare. Some are suggesting that we capture this new
stage of mediatization with terms like “the first digital network war” or “the first war of the
Information Age.” All of this implies significant and important developments which need further
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investigation. Yet is also leaves us with the important reminder that neither the media nor the
dynamic forces of mediatization will be sufficient to prevent the next war of choice.
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